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Unfair trial: Court says judge asked too many questions in case

Published:Friday | May 21, 2021 | 12:14 AMBarbara Gayle/Contributor

A man, who was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend, is to face a retrial in the St Elizabeth Circuit Court on April 4 next year, because the Court of Appeal found that there was excessive interference in relation to the many questions asked by the judge during his trial by a jury in 2017.

Lamont Ricketts, 43, construction worker and tailor, is charged with the murder of 26-year-old bartender Kadian Clarke, who died in March 2009 because of severe burns she received when her dwelling at Rock Hill in the parish was allegedly set ablaze on the night of February 17, 2009.

The court, in quashing Ricketts’ conviction and setting aside the sentence of life imprisonment, outlined the parameters which judges should follow during the course of their adjudication.

Attorney-at-law Audrey Clarke, who is representing Ricketts at his second trial, said this week that he is now on bail awaiting his trial.

Attorney-at-law Trevor Ho-Lyn, who represented Ricketts on appeal, had argued that the judge “denied the appellant a fair trial because of his excessive interference in the giving of evidence by the appellant, effectively becoming a participant at the bar, instead of from the bench”.

Several other grounds were filed but the court allowed the appeal mainly on the basis of the excessive interference.

The Crown conceded that having regard to the nature of the judge’s interventions, inferences could be drawn by the jury which could be adverse to the appellant. The Crown admitted that “the interventions were of such a nature, having regard to the content of the questions and the context of the case, that the appellant did not receive a fair trial”.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Ho-Lyn pointed out that of the 549 questions asked of the appellant during his examination in chief, the judge had posed 211. In relation to cross-examination, Ho-Lyn argued that of the 420 questions put to the appellant, the judge had posed 130. Ho-Lyn said the judge’s interventions went beyond seeking clarification, or clearing up any obscure point that was made, and therefore rendered the trial unfair.

In allowing the appeal, the court said the Crown made the right concession. The court found that the judge’s interventions had the cumulative effect of raising the possible perception that the judge favoured one side and further creating considerable doubt that the appellant received a fair trial. The Court of Appeal said that “although an excess of interventions by trial judges could not fairly be said to be widespread, lest it become so, this may be an opportune time to remind judges of the main parameters that circumscribe their right to intervene in the course of their adjudication”.

After reviewing a number of authorities in relation to interventions, the court said the interventions in Ricketts’ trial, regrettably, had the effect of breaching many, if not most, of the guidance in the cases reviewed and then issued the following reminders:

“Trial judges should, as much as possible, limit their questioning to what is necessary to clear up issues, better understand evidence and bring to the fore points overlooked or not sufficiently addressed. Their questioning should not be of such a nature, or go to such an extent, as to give the impression that they have taken sides or have descended into the arena and lost their impartiality. They should try not to interrupt the flow of evidence and, as much as possible, should not take over the elicitation of evidence from counsel (though the temptation is likely to arise when the evidence is being led less than competently).

“They should not cross-examine witnesses. They should not display any hostility or advertise attitude, or convey any negative view of a particular case or witness whilst hearing arguments and evidence, although they are, of course, entitled to test the soundness of arguments and submissions. They are required at all times and, so far as humanly possible, to maintain a balanced and umpire-like approach to the task of adjudication.”