Crunch time

Maxine Henry-Wilson, Contributor

The anger and agony experienced by the nation over the last week, while a demonstration of the growing political maturity of the Jamaica populace, must also stand as a rebuke to the political class. The week's events are a positive indication of the potential empowerment of ordinary citizens when they speak in unison. Yet all of us who are political leaders must have watched with bated breath and introspection as we recognised our collective failure.

The Dudus-Manatt, Phelps & Phillips affair and the dilemma posed to Bruce Golding and the Jamaica Labour Party are only a manifestation of what is wrong with the internal processes of our two political parties. The capture by diehards who expect the state to use its resources for their material and other benefit can only have the most disastrous consequences.

For me, both the events and the outcomes to date are a reminder of what has been one of the bloodiest periods in our nation's history as well as living evidence of how a converting crisis can be converted into an opportunity of enduring benefit to our nation. The violence and upheaval of the 1970s reached a crescendo in 1979 and, ultimately, led to the commitment of both political leaders to pursue root and branch electoral reform. This process, which has been ongoing for the last 31 years, has much to teach us about ensuring a permanent resolution to the present political crisis.

Many of us recall the climate of fear that gripped the entire nation in 1979, culminating in the murders of over 800 persons and the elections of 1980. What many may not remember is that in this period of anarchy and political stalemate, the incumbent prime minister, Michael Manley, in an attempt to break the deadlock, announced his intention to hold an election 'at the earliest possible opportunity'. However, such an opportunity would not arise until October 30 - some eight months later. During that period, the country had become ungovernable; there was a massive exodus by those who could leave Jamaica. The rest stayed and suffered unbelievable food shortages and lived in trepidation.

The absence of a credible electoral system was the cause of this inordinate and, for many, fatal delay in holding elections. Based on this crisis, there was the decision to give priority to urgent and consensual electoral reform. The formation of the Electoral Advisory Committee was one outcome of this resolve of the nation that NEVER AGAIN should there be a recurrence of the events of 1979-1980. It took nearly three decades to create a credible and now internationally recognised, modern, free and fair electoral system. It was not a unilinear process. There were many twists, turns, disagreements, resignations and more, but, in the end, the larger objective prevailed and the nation was saved.

salient lessons

Confronted with the present impasse and the erosion of credibility of the political system and of its primary players on both sides of the political divide, there are several salient lessons to be learned from the approach taken to electoral reform - lessons that we should examine as we try to fix a broken political process.

The first lesson is to recognise that we are, indeed, in a crisis and take steps to convert this into an opportunity. This may sound cliched but until all those within and without the political process recognise that it is confronted with the potential of 'de-legitimation', that there is a real danger of implosion on the system, then we will continue to point fingers.

The second lesson relates to the kind of institutional arrangement that can effectively reform this broken system. In the case of electoral reform, there was the marriage of strong representatives of civil society with political representatives. All sat around a table and devised a comprehensive and multidimensional programme consisting of legislative, administrative and technical reforms. The strengthening of the implementing entity - the electoral office - its insulation from partisan interference and the recruitment of top-of-the-line, competent persons was the platform for effecting reform.

The inclusion of independent members who were known for integrity and commitment to the nation, the process of appointment of these members, although leading in a few instances to a stand-off, ultimately provided a check on the actions of the party representatives. The point is that despite the setbacks, there was a process which was recognised and accepted by all and so, over time, some trust was built. This process was nested in law. Over time, conventions developed such as the passing of the recommendations of the Electoral Advisory Committee by unanimous vote in Parliament, after study by the Parliamentary Committee. This practice was to symbolise consensus and non partisan haggling over electoral matters.

The third lesson is the invigilation of overseas entities. The Carter Centre and the Commonwealth Secretariat inter alia provided top-class technical assistance and oversight of the process. Sometimes, as a people, we believe that external advice and support constitute re-colonisation but this really is the availability of a 'disinterested' party who can catch us OUT when we misplay the ball.

Aspects of the reform were linked to broader technical assistance from bilateral and multilateral agencies, so there was a vested interest by all in making progress with this agenda.

In our present crisis, we need to find a mechanism that can create a programme of action and in a systematic way implement these reforms. What are some elements of this reform?

parties need structure

The political parties now need to operate as formal institutions with clearly defined, publicly known structures and rules of engagement. This includes modern constitutions and administrative arrangements. There need to be rules and obligations of membership versus association. For me, this is one of the dilemmas facing the two political parties - how do you separate these two categories of persons? In the past, certainly rhetorically if not practically, a distinction was made between a vanguard party and a mass party. In more recent times, the thrust is toward a mass party but the latter gives less control over rules of entry and participation, as well as the quality assurance in terms of the values that guide the organisation and that constitute the practice and behaviour of those who embrace the party.

The issue becomes how to upgrade and modernise the institutionalisation of these entities without seeming to prescribe for them or interfere in their functioning. In the recent past, the EAC attempted to define 'a political party' as part of the qualification for state funding of party electoral personnel, etc. This initiative needs to be revisited and made more robust and relevant.

A second area of reform must be in terms of the selection of candidates. While not interfering in the internal processes of the parties, there must be some code that defines eligibility. There is an existing National Code of Conduct but this needs to go beyond behaviour during an election campaign and embody principles and procedures to guide who are considered appropriate as electoral candidates and further as parliamentary representatives. This code should also provide a framework for the behaviour of elected representatives.

For example, the model used in the British system to control conflicts of interest by parliamentarians presents a starting point for our consideration. There must be sanctions for breaches and debate and discussion of impeachment with the objective of enacting such processes into law. All this must be invigilated by a credible institution. There is the legitimate hesitation to add another entity to an already bloated bureaucracy but is there scope for institutional innovation? For example, a tribunal consisting of the political ombudsman, the chairman of the Electoral Commission and the Integrity Commission who receive statutory reports from the parties and who have powers of investigation?

other essential issues

There are other issues essential to rebuilding trust in the system. One of these is the process of transition from one administration to another - the need to provide audited performance and programme reports within ministries that should be presented to the new ministers on their assumption of office and which should be made public. This would remove some of the speculation and blame game and allow for informed debate about the way forward by a new administration.

Additionally, there must be an accepted approach to the treatment of boards and top civil servants. This is a matter that has engendered much heat but provided little light. The core consideration is the extent to which a new government has the right and the scope to enact new policies and the commitment of inherited civil servants to carry forward this mandate. It is a discussion that takes place in other jurisdictions and a recognition that there is a legitimate discourse around this matter.

This process of reform is urgent and indispensable to the survival of our democracy. To delay is to endanger our nation.