The West Kingston crisis and party politics - Part 2

The following is the second part of an excerpt from a presentation made by Rupert Lewis, professor of political thought, University of the West Indies (UWI), Mona, during a symposium 'States of Freedom: Freedom of States' at the Mona Visitors' Lodge, UWI, Mona campus, June 16-18. Part 1 was published on June 27.

It took over nine months for Prime Minister Bruce Golding to decide that the extradition order requested by the US government would be signed. Without the pressure of the US Justice Department on the extradition and the pressure exerted by the UK, Canada and EU missions there would have been no crisis. The co-rulership between the MP and the don would have gone on as normal.

The prime minister's critique of the Americans was that the evidence against Coke was illegally obtained. The second was his denial that his government had any dealings with the US law firm Manatt, Phelps and Phillips. The prime minister later admitted in parliament that he sanctioned the JLP's securing the legal skills of Manatt, Phelps and Phillips to lobby against the extradition of Mr Coke.

Facing calls from civil society for his resignation he went on retreat with his party hierarchy which endorsed his leadership and then he faced the public in a broadcast asking for forgiveness.

As soon as he announced in that broadcast that the extradition order was going to be served, Tivoli Gardens went into battle mode. They had had nine months to prepare. They had arms, they constructed barricades, they organised a march of women in white to show their love and support for Mr Coke.

police battle

Drawing on their experience of the police offensives in 1997 and especially 2001 when 27 of their number were killed, they were prepared to fight another police battle but this time the army and police were mobilised with different tactics.

Moreover, the attacks and burning of police stations in West Kingston put public opinion on the side of the security forces for the moment. The military offensive saw the blasting of new entry points into Tivoli, avoiding the booby-trapped barricades that were said to be connected to electricity.

The security forces had some aerial support from a special aircraft, maybe a drone, that enabled the security forces to pick off gunmen on the roofs of buildings and provide operational intelligence. Coke and the militia in Tivoli fled.

What are the implications of this for politics?

First, a searchlight has been turned on the connection between drug and gun-running and the ruling party. But no politician has been connected.

Second, there is an awareness that the JLP connection with crime does not absolve the People's National Party which has its dons, garrison constituencies and its supporters who are also in the business of the trade in drugs and guns.

Third, had not the US Justice Department and the State Department acted it would have been 'Jamaica no problem', as the Tivoli status quo would have remained intact.

Fourth, these patterns are not unique to Jamaica and they exist and threaten states in Latin America and Caribbean countries such as Mexico, Columbia and Haiti. Fourth, the Jamaican political elite have little political will to take on the drug dons. Actions that have been taken against dons have been a result of US pressure.

Fifth, the lumpen proletariat's rise in Jamaican politics is phenomenal and it coincides with the decline of the role of the middle class in the political parties and a co-option of a part of the middle class and business community in and outside of the political parties in criminal enterprise.

What are some of the consequences for daily life?

The first is fear, fear of speaking out because of the threats of violence and the possibility of being killed. In addition there is enormous stress compounded by the impact of the global economic contraction and the indebtedness of the State. The Jamaican population has been weakened after decades of futile politics and economic impoverishment.

Are Jamaican politicians capable or willing to reform the political system?

The defeat of democratic socialism in the 1980s represented a fundamental shift not only to enterprise politics in the JLP but more importantly in the PNP and this was raised to a level of serious political ingenuity by P.J. Patterson who abandoned political education and created a party that would not only be capable of winning elections but would assist the politically-connected black middle class to become a bourgeoisie through the award of state contracts. The young PNP and JLP activists at the UWI in the past 20 years have learnt this lesson well.

It should, however, be remembered that both parties have thousands of supporters and party workers who are committed to their organisation and who are not the beneficiaries of state contracts or state offices and it is here that hope lies. The growth of civic consciousness and civil society organisations must also be welcomed but these are spheres that impact on politics but are not at the core of politics.

Truth before reconciliation

A major demand of civil society is for truth and reconciliation. So far no politician has been taken in for questioning although there are a number who are said to be 'persons of interest' and rumours abound concerning US visa restrictions. There is clearly a need for truth in politics.

Truth comes before reconciliation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa and its work during the period 1996-1998 was part of a transition mechanism in the transfer of power from a white minority rule to democratic rule based on the right to vote of all its citizens.

Nelson Mandela sought reconciliation because the new government needed to exercise its power in a context where it would not be sabotaged by elements in the military in particular and white extremists who wanted to create a separate white state. Mandela recognised that his presidency had to have the legitimacy based not only on the black majority but all South Africa.

For the TRC to work there had to be concessions and amnesty was one such concession which allowed those who had acted on the basis of orders of the apartheid state and had committed gross human rights violations to publicly admit those violations and seek amnesty and possibly pardon and forgiveness. The corollary was that those who had fought in the liberation movement and had killed civilians or killed recalcitrant members within the ANC (African National Congress) had to be held accountable.

The focus of the TRC was on the victims - those who had suffered violations, their families and their right to knowledge of the truth as to the circumstances under which their loved ones were killed, where they were buried and of course compensation.

On the latter issue of reparations the TRC did not live up to the promise of adequate reparations. But the TRC was part of a broader process of the transfer of power in which memory of the past, particularly the years 1960-1994, would not be lost to amnesia but would be part of the way the new state constituted its memory of its recent past.

This process of transition stemmed from negotiations between the political parties primarily the National Party of F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela and most importantly there was a strong national and international political momentum for change from apartheid.

Jermaine McCalpin's analysis of the failed Truth Commissions in Grenada and Haiti would be the likely outcome for Jamaica. Jamaica's truth commission will have to be handled by investigative journalism and the monitoring by civil society of the conduct of political parties.

What kind of transition are we contemplating in Jamaica that would make a truth commission meaningful? While Jamaica is not now experiencing a transition it is worthwhile thinking about the reorganisation of political life at the level of how political parties function in the 60 political constituencies.

Our political parties need to break with the gangs and with organised crime. Understanding the role of Christopher Coke in Tivoli and in party conferences and key party decisions about constituency representation, party leadership decisions and access to state contracts will assist us in understanding the depths of the problems.

Similarly work needs to be done with area leaders and dons on the PNP side who also wield power within that institution and over party leaders. My feeling is that parties have become compromised to such a large extent that they lack the capability for internal regulation or party cleansing. Therefore, far more exposure of the political aspects of organised crime and politics needs to take place and in this regard the role of media and civil society is critical.

Practical suggestions

My basic premise about political reform is that this best comes about when there is a social movement focused on an agenda for change in which people put trust in their own capabilities and not those of special leaders, although these may appear and embody our best aspirations or worst fears. The risk here is that you could get something worse replacing the old or you could get something better.

Research work on political parties need to be undertaken; and how they function at the level of constituencies is important. A study of the West Kingston constituency needs to be done.

One of the consequences of the West Kingston crisis is that it has disempowered one of the major garrisons. However, a de-garrisoned constituency, whatever that means, cannot be rebuilt without the freedom for democratic politics and political competition within and between parties and the ability of its citizens to participate fully in political life.