The ECJ - a rags-to-riches story

Edward Seaga

From the very first general election in Jamaica in 1944, it became apparent that the results of voting under the introduction of adult suffrage could be perverted by bogus voting.

In every election for the next 15 years, bogus voting from both political parties made an impact on the results. In 1959, in a by-election between Vernon Arnett (PNP) and D.C. Tavares Jr (JLP) to fill a vacancy in the Trench Town constituency of lower St Andrew, bogus voting took a quantum leap. Truckloads of people were brought in by PNP organisers to vote for the party candidate. The result was, as planned, a huge victory for the PNP.

Bustamante recognised that the scope of the game had changed with the massive mobilisation of bogus votes against which the JLP could not prevail. This led to his intervention in the 1961 debate in Parliament on the issue of fraudulent elections in the debate on the framing of a new Constitution for independent Jamaica.

The PNP would not accept the Bustamante call for electoral reforms. Hence, the matter was referred to the final independence conference to be held in Lancaster House in London in 1962 when unsettled matters were to be resolved by the British secretary of state, Ian McLeod. The decision led to this gem for inclusion in the new constitution:

"No person shall vote in an election ...

(a) Who is not entitled to vote.

(b) When he is not entitled to vote.

(c) Where he is not entitled to vote."

This provision in the Constitution required the introduction of identity cards with the photograph of each voter. In 1967, ID cards were introduced in urban areas where impersonation of voters was prevalent. The PNP objected. The introduction of ID cards removed 32 per cent, or 253,000, names from the voters' list, for which no matching persons could be found. This provided for much cleaner elections in 1967 and 1972.

The voters' list for the 1976 election showed an unbelievable 44 per cent, or 265,000, names added to the list compared to 1972. In effect, the 253,000 names removed in 1967 because the persons did not exist at the addresses given were replaced by virtually the same number of additional names, 265,000, by 1976.

police interference

This provided the basis for a list padded with thousands of names to make wide-scale impersonation possible in the general election of 1976 held under a state of emergency. But a new malpractice emerged in 1976. Using the powers of the state of emergency, policemen pulled vehicles transporting JLP workers and voters off the road, detained candidates and terrorised JLP voters in selected areas on election day. Impersonation occurred widely including the rural areas in particular, aided by the fictitious names.

This was the first election in which policemen were used extensively to distort the vote. The extent of malpractices in the 1976 general election, and repeated in two by-elections which followed, led me to take the stand that the JLP would not participate in any further elections unless the responsibility for electoral affairs was removed from ministerial control.

Manley was in no position to refuse. Jamaica was under severe pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor countries. As a result of discussions between myself and P. J. Patterson, delegated by Prime Minister Manley, an Electoral Advisory Committee was established to take operational control of elections. Three persons who were acceptable to both political parties were appointed by the governor general as the core of the committee. Two representatives were added from each of the two parties. It was thought that this was the solution since the minister would have no operational influence. But it was not.

After further electoral fraud, on a serious-but-lesser scale, in 1980, 1986, 1989 and 1990, by 1993, the electoral system was once again compromised, this time moreso than in any previous election. It was recognised that a new approach was needed.

Within a few days after the 1993 election, reports were pouring into the JLP headquarters concerning the scale of electoral fraud. As in the 1976 election, renegade policemen played a pivotal role in carrying out and aiding political intimidation and violence against the JLP to affect the vote.

electoral fraud

To set the stage for understanding this wholesale fraud, a compilation of the complaints of JLP candidates and other electoral personnel and publications in the media was commissioned by the JLP. The 56-page report on 'Election Malpractices in the General Election', March 30, 1993, published a chilling catalogue of fraudulent activities.

In preparation of the electoral list:

1. By January 1993, it became clear that the identification cards for 300,000 voters would not be ready for the expected March deadline for the election;

2. By early March, after the election had been announced, it became clear that there were substantial errors in the voters' lists involving tens of thousands of names;

3. The JPL representative on the EAC expressed serious doubts that the system could be ready for a March 30 election date and recommended an extension of time. This proposal was adamantly rejected by the director of elections who insisted that all preparations would be completed by March 30.

The late Professor Carl Stone wrote a landmark article on the issue after the parish council elections of March 6, 1990, which was first published on March 12, 1990:

"This time, the thuggery went far beyond what I have termed the urban 'garrison constituencies' and was orchestrated deep into the rural areas and south coast urban centres outside of the Corporate Area. What is doubly disturbing about it is that it took place right under the nose of the security forces and, in some cases, was aided and abetted by corrupt policemen."

The chairman of the Electoral Advisory Committee, Professor Gladstone Mills, expressed shock at the level of fraud. "It is clear," he said that "in some constituencies no election took place at all" (The Sunday Herald, April 4, 1993). The Political Ombudsman Justice Kerr condemned the "political role of the police in the polls" (The Jamaica Herald, May 4, 1993). The Jamaica Council of Churches charged "poll fraud" (The Jamaica Herald, April 3, 1993). The Daily Gleaner, (April 10, 1993), in an editorial, called for reform of the electoral system and The Jamaica Herald editorialised, 'Reform the Police Force' (April 11, 1993). Prime Minister, P. J. Patterson commended the police. The police force was awarded a generous revision of salary shortly before the election.

The report from which I have drawn the preceding information has been quoted only in brief summary form with the chilling details omitted in the interest of space. On receipt of the report, I issued a call for a commission of enquiry on May 7, to enquire into the role of the police "as an instrument of political intimidation on so wide a scale as to be effective in determining the outcome of many seats ... that the public must be made fully aware ... to dealeffectively with this problem in the reform of the criminal justice system which is now being given consideration".

See Part Two next week.

Edward Seaga is a former prime minister. He is now chancellor of the University of Technology and a distinguished fellow at the UWI. Email columns@gleanerjm.com and odf@uwimona.edu.jm.