What a Trump victory would mean for Latin America

BOSTON: After the euphoric Democratic National Convention in Chicago, there is little doubt that Kamala Harris’ candidacy has changed the dynamics of the 2024 US presidential race. Democrats now have a fighting chance, which is more than they could have said a few months ago. However, with polls still showing an extremely close contest in the seven swing states that ultimately matter, the rest of the world must brace for what Donald Trump’s return to the White House would entail.

For starters, Trump has indicated that he would once again ditch the Paris climate agreement and browbeat America’s European allies, perhaps even going so far as to try to abandon NATO. Similarly, the South Koreans and the Japanese are not sure what to expect, given Trump’s perennial complaint that they are not paying their fair share of the cost to station US troops within their borders.

But the region that would be most affected by another Trump presidency is Latin America. After all, Latin American immigrants to the United States are Trump’s favourite political target, the tried-and-true “other” to his “real Americans.” Nine years after declaring his candidacy with a speech vilifying Mexicans as “drug dealers, criminals, rapists,” Trump still relishes such language when describing migrants from the region.

In his speech at the Republican National Convention (RNC) in Milwaukee, he railed not only against Venezuela (which was predictable) but also against El Salvador, which is led by a right-wing strongman, Nayib Bukele, who has incarcerated 2% of the adult population and considers himself a friend of Trump. But according to Trump, murders are down in El Salvador because it is sending its criminals to the US.

Moreover, many Republicans now endorse proposals to bomb cartel facilities in Mexico to stop the flow of fentanyl northward. According to Trump’s vice-presidential pick, J.D. Vance, the president should have the authority to deploy the US military against Mexican drug cartels in Mexican territory.

Then there is Trump’s central obsession, which featured prominently on placards at the RNC: “MASS DEPORTATION NOW.” He has promised that, if elected, one of his first moves will be to order the roundup of undocumented immigrants, who would be detained in camps on the Mexican border and then expelled from the country.

Although estimates vary, the Migration Policy Institute calculates that there are around 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US – including five million Mexicans, two million Central Americans, and a million from several South American countries. Although the legal, logistical, and organisational challenges of such an undertaking would be monumental, the scale of the task would not stop Trump from trying, especially now that the Supreme Court has granted the president immunity for almost anything he does in office.

If Trump were to start deporting hundreds of thousands of people, the effects on their home countries would be profound. The remittances that so many in the region rely on would dry up, exacerbating the economic conditions that cause many migrants to venture north in the first place. Ironically, El Salvador, that supposed bastion of law and order, would be one of the most heavily affected.

Trade also would be hit hard, given Trump’s protectionist proclivities. In the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Trump Risk Index, which identifies the countries with deep trade relations and immigration- and security-related ties to the US, Mexico tops the list, scoring 71 out of 100. Trump has vowed to impose a 10% tariff on all imported goods (plus a 60% tariff on all goods imported from China), and it is unclear whether this would apply even to countries with which the US has free-trade agreements: Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, as well as several Central American countries.

Here, too, Trump is likely to face few constraints, given both parties’ waning support for FTAs and America’s dismissive response to complaints from the World Trade Organization in recent years. Moreover, the pro-tariff US trade representative from the first Trump administration, Robert Lighthizer, is favoured to become Treasury secretary if Trump wins.

The countries around the Caribbean Basin stand to lose the most from new tariffs, since they depend heavily on trade with the US. But South America would not be spared from the knock-on effects. In fact, it could face a double whammy if reduced trade with the US is accompanied by declining Chinese demand for South American raw materials. For Latin America and the Caribbean, China is now the region’s main trading partner – to the tune of $485 billion in 2023 – and high US tariffs on its goods would force it to cut back on production.

At the bilateral level, one could expect the imposition of further economic sanctions (if there are any left to be applied) on what John Bolton, one of Trump’s former national security advisers, famously identified as the “troika of tyranny”: Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. On the other hand, leaders seen as ideological allies of Trump, such as Argentina’s President Javier Milei, should expect invitations to the White House and other expressions of good will, though not necessarily any preferential market access.

Latin America is still struggling to get out of its deepest economic downturn in 120 years. Regional GDP fell by 6.6% when the pandemic erupted in 2020, and the region still has not recovered. Projections indicate that growth this year will be the slowest of any world region, except Europe, at 1.8%. Now, Latin Americans must prepare for the political earthquake that may be coming in 2025.

Jorge Heine is a research professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.

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