Editorial | Jamaica Defence Force and trust

First, this newspaper subscribes fully to the concept of the separation of powers, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the sanctity of the courts.

So, we have no question, based on the law, and in accordance with the evidence delivered before it, that the court made the right decision in acquitting the three Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) soldiers – Lance Corporals Greg Tingling and Odel Buckley and Private Arnold Henry – who were charged with murder for killing accountant Keith Clarke during the 2010 state of public emergency.

The defence say Mr Clarke died during a hunt for the notorious crime boss and former west Kingston political enforcer, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, who was on the run from extradition to the United States. The army believed Coke was holed up in Mr Clarke’s home.

But the trial has dented the JDF’s prized reputation for efficiency and accountability, which the chief of defence staff (CDS), Antonette Wemyss Gorman, must move urgently to repair, lest it leads to a deeper erosion of confidence in the army and hurt Vice Admiral Wemyss Gorman’s ultimate legacy as the first female head of the military.

It is just not good that the JDF has lost its capacity for keeping records, and for recruiting and promoting officers who don’t suffer major memory lapses, and who don’t sign and send off documents without ascertaining their accuracy.

That, in a conflict, could lead to major, and costly, strategic blunders that cost lives – and more.

It is common ground Mr Clarke, 63, was shot in the bedroom of his home in the leafy, hillside suburb of Kirkland Heights, just outside the Jamaican capital.

It is also agreed that Mr Clarke received 25 shots from high-powered weapons, and that 16 of those shots were to his back. It is generally accepted, too, that JDF soldiers fired the shots.

There is some dispute, based on interpretation of the forensic evidence, of precisely where Mr Clarke was when he was shot. His daughter and his wife, who were in the room, insisted that he was climbing from the top of a wardrobe/cupboard, with his back to the shooters. He apparently also had his licensed firearm in his hand.

The family’s claim that Mr Clarke’s initial intent was to protect his family from presumed intruders.

CONTRADICTED

A government forensic expert contradicted some of the evidence of the Clarkes and the pathologist who performed the autopsy, of where Keith Clarke could have been when he was shot.

But far more critical to this case is that no one could say for certain which JDF soldiers were in Mr Clarke’s bedroom, leading to the collapse of the case against Lance Corporals Tingling and Buckley and Private Henry.

Said Justice Dale Palmer in instructing the jury to deliver not-guilty verdicts after no-case submissions by defence lawyers: “Keith Clarke is dead. The shooters intended to kill him or to cause serious bodily harm when they shot him 16 times in the back, and ... there was no lawful excuse…

“...The Crown has several ingredients to establish, but one of the essential ingredients to establish is that of identification of the person alleged to have taken the life of the deceased. But the evidence in relation to identification remains below the standard that is required for me to call upon the defendants.”

Herein lies the reputational conundrum now faced by the JDF, which demands the attention of CDS Wemyss Gorman.

Unfortunately, the JDF lost the records of which soldiers were issued with what guns for the operation in which Mr Clarke ultimately died. And the information that exists in the form of a list with the name of individuals and the guns that were presumed to have been assigned to them – which was sent off by a JDF legal officer to external investigators – turned out to be useless. That JDF officer told the court that he didn’t himself prepare the list and hadn’t checked it for accuracy.

Context in this matter is important.

EXTRAORDINARY

The events leading to Mr Clarke’s death weren’t ordinary. They were extraordinary.

Coke was the strongman of the west Kingston enclave of Tivoli Gardens that is notoriously loyal to the governing Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The JLP administration of the day attempted to skirt America’s request to extradite Coke on drug trafficking and gun running charges, leading to a frazzled relationship between the countries.

When Jamaica finally decided to relent on the extradition, Coke’s militia attacked the security forces in his west Kingston redoubt and elsewhere, leading to days of unrest in the capital and the declaration of the state of emergency. Scores of people died in Tivoli Gardens, mostly killed by the security forces.

It is against that backdrop that the mission was mounted to capture Coke.

It has not been revealed how Coke and his cronies would have escaped from the Clarke home over which a military helicopter hovered, and where soldiers had to cut a metal grill to enter.

The weapons that were used to shoot Mr Clarke were ballistically identified by numbers assigned to them. Who had those weapons is what is problematic, leading to the crumbling of the case against the soldiers. The investigators didn’t have verifiable names.

During the trial the log book for the specific period was subpoenaed by the court. However, a JDF captain who was tasked with producing the logs gave evidence that he was unable to find it – and others.

According to Captain Kevin White, he found a series of dispatch books for the period from early 2004 to early 2010 but not that for May 2010, when the incident happened. He also found logs for 2016-2020. Presumably, there were years of gaps.

Neither could the police find the weapons and ammunition dispatch person for the relevant period, who is no longer in the army.

This kind of sloppy record-keeping (which is what we take it to be) is untenable for a body, which, in the past, has enjoyed a higher level of trust among Jamaicans than other state institutions.